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Abstract. Solving logic puzzles is a popular recreational activity. The
solution of a logic puzzle involves understanding and reasoning about
the information provided. Diagrammatic logics have been shown to help
people to understand and reason about logical information. In this pa-
per we use spider diagrams, a visual logic based on Euler diagrams, to
visualize logic problems. Furthermore, we reason with the diagrammatic
representation both syntactically and semantically until we reach a so-
lution. We present four example logic puzzles of varying difficulty and
produce their solutions in detail using spider diagrams. We suggest that
the use of diagrams is helpful in their solution.
1 Introduction
Logic puzzles have a long history. Lewis Carroll was an eminent protagonist,
see [4], for example, with logical game-playing also occurring in Alice in Won-
derland and Through the Looking Glass. Logic puzzles are usually expressed in
the form of a list of textual statements from which some information can be
deduced. The list of statements is frequently called the premise (or premises)
and the information that can be deduced is called the conclusion. The solution
involves logical reasoning to show that the conclusion follows from the premise.
Frequently in logical puzzles, the conclusion is not stated explicitly, but given
in the form of a question (or questions). The solver has to answer the question
by reasoning about the premise. The simplest of these puzzles are of the form of
classical syllogisms. For example, consider the following statements:
1. All Tigers are Cats
2. All Cats are Mammals
3. No Cats are Dogs
Are all Tigers Mammals? Are all Tigers Dogs?
As all Tigers are Cats and all Cats are Mammals, we can deduce that all Tigers are
Mammals. Similarly, as all Tigers are Cats and no Cats are Dogs, we can deduce
that no Tigers are Dogs.
We can visualise this puzzle using Euler diagrams [5]. In figure 1, the first two
statements of the puzzle are presented in an Euler diagram. From this diagram,
we can observe that the circle labelled Tiger is within the circle labelled Mammal
and hence that all Tigers are Mammals. In figure 2, the first and third statements
of the puzzle are presented in an Euler diagram. From this diagram, we can
observe that the circle labelled Tiger is disjoint from the circle labelled Dog and
hence that no Tigers are Dogs.
Fig. 1. Statements 1, 2 Fig. 2. Statements 1, 3 Fig. 3. Statements 1, 2, 3
In figure 3, all three statements are visualized. From this diagram, we can
observe that all Tigers are Mammals and that no Tigers are Dogs. The circles
labelled Mammal and Dog intersect because we are not given any information
about the relationship between mammals and dogs; some dogs could be mammals
and some dogs could not be mammals. The diagrams we are using do not have
existential import; some of the regions in the diagram could represent the empty
set. Hence, we cannot deduce that all dogs are mammals, even though we know
from biological taxonomy that dogs are mammals. This is a lesson we can learn
when considering logical puzzles and indeed logical statements generally: we
should not make assumptions. We can only use the information provided – and,
of course, anything we can deduce from that information.
There is a widespread belief that the use of diagrammatic logics, such as
Euler diagrams, is helpful in allowing people to understand and reason about
logical information. One reason often cited for this is that some diagrammatic
notations are well-matched. A notation is well-matched to meaning if its seman-
tic relationships are matched by its syntactic relationships [7]. For example, in
figure 1, the semantic relationship ‘All Tigers are Cats’ (statement 1) is matched
by the curve labelled Cat containing the curve Tiger in the diagrammatic rep-
resentation. Similarly, in figure 2, the semantic relationship ‘No Cats are Dogs’
(statement 3) is matched by the curves labelled Cat and Dog being disjoint in
the diagrammatic representation. Diagram well-matchedness can help people to
understand information. Other properties of diagrams can help people to reason
about information.
Diagrams can also contain free rides when compared to the same information
represented textually (or symbolically) [11]. Free rides occur when the topological
properties of a diagram force some logical consequence to be made explicit, where
that consequence would otherwise take some inferential steps. For example, as
discussed above, from statement 1, all Tigers are Cats, and statement 2, all
Cats are Mammals, we can deduce that all Tigers are Mammals. However, in
figure 1, we can observe directly that all Tigers are Mammals. As such, ‘all
Tigers are Mammals’ is an example of a free ride exhibited by the diagram in
comparison to the textual representation. A similar free-ride, ‘No Tigers are
Dogs’, can be observed in figure 2 compared to the textual representation, where
this information has to be deduced. The notion of free rides has been formalized
and extended to the theory of observational advantages [13]. Thus free rides
and observational advantages within diagrams can help people to reason about
information. These helpful properties of some diagrams have been known for a
long time: the notions of well-matchedness and free-rides are closely related to
Peirce’s concept of iconicity [10].
Many diagrammatic logics have been developed over the centuries that rep-
resent sets and their relationships. Examples include Euler diagrams, Venn dia-
grams [14] and Peirce’s existential graphs [10]. Venn diagrams are often confused
with Euler diagrams. However, in a Venn diagram all the intersections between
sets are represented; shading is used to represent the empty set. Spider dia-
grams [6] are based on Euler diagrams with the addition of syntax to represent
individuals. Spider diagrams also use shading, borrowed from Venn diagrams,
but to represent an upper bound on the cardinality of sets rather than just
emptiness. They have well-defined reasoning rules [8] and are a fully formalized
diagrammatic logic [9]. The iconicity and semiotics of spider diagrams are dis-
cussed at length in [3]. We will use spider diagrams as the vehicle to visualize
and solve logical puzzles.
The mathematician Raymond Smullyan was a very prominent exponent of
the art and science of recreational logic puzzle production. He is well-known for
puzzles involving knights and knaves; knights always tell the truth and knaves
always lie. Some of the puzzles considered in this paper are based on knights and
knaves. In particular, they are adapted from Smullyan’s The Go¨dellian Puzzle
Book [12], in which he uses puzzles to describe and prove Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem. Smullyan died in 2017 at the age of 97. This paper is dedicated to his
memory. It begins in the strange land of knights and knaves.
2 Smullyan Island
Smullyan Island is a very peculiar place. All the inhabitants are either Knights
or Knaves but not both. Knights always tell the truth but Knaves always lie.
The inhabitants of Smullyan Island are a playful lot and like to pose puzzles.
However, you can’t always believe what they say – unless they are Knights, of
course. Unfortunately, you can’t tell just by looking who is a Knight and who is
a Knave. The first puzzle involves inhabitants of Smullyan Island. It is adapted
from [12].
2.1 The Prize Puzzle
Three inhabitants of Smullyan Island are named Alice, Bob and Carol. At least
one of them is a Knight and at least one is a Knave. Exactly one of them has a
prize. They made the following statements:
– Alice: Bob doesn’t have the prize
– Bob: I don’t have the prize
– Carol: I have the prize
Who has the prize?
Solution
We start the solution by rephrasing the puzzle’s context in diagrammatic form:
The diagram, d1, states that there are exactly three individuals in the universe
that we are considering: Alice, Bob and Carol, which we abbreviate to a, b and c,
respectively. The shading tells us that there are no other elements except those
represented by the dots. Diagram, d2, states that there is at least one Knight
and at least one Knave. The shading indicates that all individuals are Knights
or Knaves. The diagram, d3, states that there is exactly one Prize holder. These
statements are invariants: they are assumed to be true.
Having set up the puzzle’s context, we can now consider the inhabitants’
statements. For each of the inhabitants there are two cases. Either they are a
Knight and therefore tell the truth or they are a Knave and therefore lie. We
start by considering Alice’s statement in the two cases.
Alice is a Knight and therefore tells the truth and so Bob doesn’t have the prize:
Alice is a Knave and therefore is lying and so Bob does have the prize:
We now consider Bob’s statement in the two cases.
Bob is a Knight and therefore tells the truth and so he doesn’t have the prize:
Bob is a Knave and therefore is lying and so he does have the prize:
There are four possible combinations of Alice’s and Bob’s statements.
Alice and Bob are both Knights so we combine d4 and d6:
Alice and Bob are both Knaves so we combine d5 and d7:
Alice is a Knight and Bob is a Knave so we combine d4 and d7:
Alice is a Knave and Bob is a Knight so we combine d5 and d6:
In the last two cases, d10 and d11, we can observe the free ride: Bob has the prize
and simultaneously doesn’t have the prize. Hence, d10 and d11 are contradictory
and we discard them. We are left with two cases: Alice and Bob are both Knights,
visualized in d8; and Alice and Bob are both Knaves, visualized in d9.
We now consider both cases for Carol’s statement.
Carol is a Knight and therefore tells the truth and so does have the prize:
Carol is a Knave and therefore is lying and so doesn’t have the prize:
We now combine d8 and d9, derived from Alice’s and Bob’s statements, with
d12 and d13, derived from Carol’s statement. There are four possibilities.
Alice, Bob and Carol are all Knights so we combine d8 and d12:
Alice, Bob and Carol are all Knaves so we combine d9 and d13:
Alice and Bob are Knights, Carol is a Knave so we combine d8 and d13:
Alice and Bob are Knaves, Carol is a Knight so we combine d9 and d12:
In the first case, d14, all three inhabitants are Knights and the second case, d15,
all three are Knaves. However, by d2, there must be at least one Knight and at
least one Knave. So these two cases are contradictory and we discard them. We
are left with two possibilities: Alice and Bob are Knights and Carol is a Knave,
d16; or Alice and Bob are Knaves, and Carol is a Knight, d17.
In d17, both Bob and Carol have the prize, which contradicts d3 as there must
be a unique prize holder. So we can discard this case. Hence, d16 is the only valid
case. We therefore arrive at the final step in the solution:
As neither Bob nor Carol has the prize, then, by d1 and d3, Alice must have the
prize. Furthermore, we have determined that Alice and Bob are Knights and Carol
is a Knave.
The solution was undertaken in a systematic way. We set up the context of
the puzzle and then considered each statement in the order it was presented.
We considered all of the cases, but ruled out those that were contradictory. In
some cases, we could observe the contradictions as free rides; in other cases,
we could derive contradictions from the information observable in the diagrams.
The solution was presented diagrammatically in d18 with two boxes: one giving
information about Knights and Knaves; the other about the prize holder. We
can express this information in one box showing the relation between the prize
holder and the Knights and Knaves directly:
It is gratifying to know that the prize holder is a Knight. The next puzzle is
also adapted from [12] and again features three inhabitants of Smullyan Island.
This time one of them is a magician and the statements they make are a little bit
more complex, involving a disjunction and a negated conjunction. The diagrams
representing these statements are therefore a bit more complicated than those
in the Prize Puzzle.
2.2 The Magician Puzzle
Three inhabitants of Smullyan Island are named Ali, Beth and Chris. Exactly one
of them is a Magician. They made the following statements:
– Ali: Beth is not both a Knave and a Magician
– Beth: Either Ali is a Knave or I am not a Magician
– Chris: The Magician is a Knave
Who is the Magician?
Solution
Again, we start by setting up the premises diagrammatically:
The diagram d1 states that there are exactly three individuals in the universe
that we are considering: Ali, Beth and Chris, which we again abbreviate to a, b
and c, respectively. The diagram d2 states that every element is either a Knight
or a Knave, but not both, and d3 states that there is exactly one Magician.
The solution to the Prize Puzzle was undertaken in a very systematic, way.
We will be more strategic in the solution to this puzzle. Chris’s statement is the
simplest, so we will consider it first. There are two possibilities: Chris is a Knight
or Chris is a Knave. We consider Chris’s statement in the two cases.
Chris is a Knight and therefore tells the truth and so the Magician is a Knave:
Chris is a Knave and therefore is lying and so the Magician is a Knight:
We observe from d4 that if Chris is a Knight then he is not the Magician. We also
observe from d5 that if Chris is a Knave then he is not the Magician. So we have
deduced that Chris is not the Magician:
Next, we consider Ali’s statement. This time, we consider the cases sepa-
rately. We consider the case in which Ali is a Knave first, as the negation of Ali’s
statement is simpler.
Assume that Ali is a Knave. He is therefore lying and hence Beth is both a
Knave and a Magician:
We observe from d7 that Beth is a Knave. We now consider Beth’s statement.
Beth’s statement is true because we are assuming that Ali is a Knave. Hence,
Beth is a Knight.
We deduce:
Beth is both a Knave and a Knight which contradicts d2. This contradiction arose
from assuming that Ali was a Knave. Hence Ali is not a Knave and therefore must
be a Knight by d2. Now we again consider Ali’s statement but this time we know
that he is a Knight.
Ali is a Knight and therefore tells the truth. Therefore Beth is not both a Knave
and a Magician:
In d9, a 3-footed spider is used to convey the information that Beth is therefore
a Knave but not a Magician, a Magician but not a Knave, or neither a Knave nor
a Magician (that is, Beth is not both a Knave and a Magician).
We now consider Beth’s statement. We begin by assuming that Beth is a Knave.
The negation of Beth’s statement is: “Ali is not a Knave and I am a Magician.”
From this we deduce that Ali is a Knight and Beth is a Magician:
We visualize the case Ali is a Knight and Beth is a Knave by combining d9 and d10:
It can be clearly observed that d11 is contradictory. Beth is not both a Knave
and a Magician and, at the same time, is both a Knave and a Magician. Thus
our assumption that Beth is a Knave is false. Therefore Beth a Knight. Now we
consider Beth’s statement knowing that she is a Knight. As Ali is not a Knave,
we deduce from Beth’s statement that Beth is not a Magician:
As we have already deduced that Chris is not a Magician (d6), the information
we have obtained so far is:
Hence, as Beth and Chris are not Magicians, by d3, Ali is the Magician:
Finally, Chris stated that the Magician is a Knave. However, Ali is not a Knave.
Hence Chris is lying and is therefore a Knave. The complete solution is:
This puzzle was a little bit harder to solve than the first one. Rather than
systematically working through the puzzle’s statements, we considered the sim-
plest statement first and then strategically determined the order in which the
statements were considered.
3 Metapuzzles
A metapuzzle is a type of puzzle for which the solution requires knowing that
others could or could not solve it. The following example is also adapted from [12]
and again considers inhabitants of Smullyan Island. This puzzle requires the
involvement of a friendly logician.
3.1 The Medic Puzzle
A logician, Ray, meets three inhabitants of Smullyan Island, Al, Bal and Cal. At
least two of them are Knaves. Also, exactly one of them is a Medic. Al and Bal
made the following statements:
– Al: I am the Medic
– Bal: I am not the Medic
Ray then asks Cal, “Is Al really the Medic?”
Cal answered and then Ray knew which one was the Medic. (We do not know
whether Cal answered yes or no.)
Who is the Medic?
Solution
We again visualize the premises:
The diagram, d1, states that there are exactly three individuals in the universe
that we are considering: Al, Bal and Cal, which we abbreviate to a, b and c,
respectively. The diagram, d2, states that there are at least two Knaves and d3
that there is exactly one Medic.
Assume that Al is a Knight:
Al is telling the truth and so Al is the Medic. As Al is a Knight, Bal and Cal must
be Knaves by d2. Hence we have:
Bal is lying and so is also a Medic. This contradicts d3.
Hence, our assumption that Al is a Knight is false, so Al is a Knave:
Al is lying and so is not the Medic. There are two cases to consider: Bal is a
Knight or Bal is a Knave. Assume that Bal is a Knight:
Bal is telling the truth and so is not the Medic. We already know that Al is a
Knave and not the Medic, so Cal is a Knave and is the Medic.
Now we assume that Bal is a Knave:
Bal is lying and so is the Medic. We cannot determine whether Cal is a Knight
or a Knave.
We need to distinguish between the two cases, d4 and d5. If Cal is a Knave,
then either of the two cases can occur. So, in order to distinguish between d4
and d5, Ray would have to deduce that Cal is a Knight. In which case, Cal must
have answered (truthfully) no to Ray’s question. Hence, Bal is the Medic. The
full solution is:
The next puzzle takes us away from Smullyan Island. The Hat Puzzle is
another metapuzzle. In its original form, this puzzle dates back to 1940 and
probably before. The puzzle presented here is a nice variation on the hat problem
in which one of the participants is colourblind. The puzzle is adapted from Alex
Bellos’s Puzzle column [1] in the UK’s Guardian newspaper. The puzzle was
originated by the American puzzle enthusiast Jack Lance [2].
3.2 The Hat Puzzle
A box contains two red hats and three green hats. Azalea, Barnaby and Caleb
close their eyes, take a hat from the box and put it on. When they open their
eyes they can see each other’s hats but not their own. They do not know which
hats are left in the box.
We can assume that all the protagonists are perfect logicians who tell the
truth. They know all the information in the above paragraph. In addition, one
of them is colourblind. They all know who the colourblind person is. They made
the following statements in order:
– Azalea: I dont know the colour of my hat.
– Barnaby: I dont know the colour of my hat.
– Caleb: I dont know the colour of my hat.
– Azalea: I dont know the colour of my hat.
Who is the colourblind person, and what colour is their hat?
Solution
We start the solution to the puzzle by setting up the premises diagrammatically:
The diagram, d1, states that there are exactly three individuals in the universe
that we are considering: Azalea, Barnaby and Caleb, which we abbreviate to a, b
and c, respectively. The diagram, d2, states that every individual is wearing a
Red hat or a Green hat, but not both; at most two individuals are wearing Red
hats. Diagram d3 states that there is exactly one ColourBlind individual.
Assume that the ColourBlind individual is wearing a Red hat. There are two
cases to consider: another individual is wearing a Red hat or no other individual
is wearing a Red hat. The first case is visualized as follows:
In this case, individual z can see that the other two individuals are wearing
Red hats. Individual z would therefore know the colour of their own hat which
contradicts one of the first three statements, so this case does not occur.
The second case is visualized here:
In this case, assume, without loss of generality, that y’s name occurs before z’s
name alphabetically. Then z can deduce that their hat is green as y doesn’t
know the colour of their own hat. This again contradicts one of the first three
statements. Hence this case does not occur. Therefore, the ColourBlind individual
is wearing a Green hat:
So, after the first three statements, all three individuals know that the Colour-
Blind individual is wearing a Green hat. In the fourth statement, Azalea does not
know the colour of her hat, hence Azalea is not ColourBlind:
Finally, if Caleb is ColourBlind, then, by the argument above, after the first
two statements he would be able to deduce that he is wearing a Green hat. How-
ever, this contradicts his statement. So Caleb is not ColourBlind:
Hence, Barnaby is ColourBlind and is wearing a Green hat:
We cannot deduce anything about the colour of the hats worn by Azalea and
Caleb. The solution of this puzzle is interesting as it involved the use of variables,
x, y, z, to deduce that the ColourBlind individual was wearing a Green hat.
4 Conclusion
We have used spider diagrams to visualize and reason about logical puzzles of
varying difficulty. We suggest that the use of diagrams is helpful in their solu-
tion. The four examples presented above may offer some evidence for this. Our
intention is not to take the fun out of puzzle solving. The diagrams provide a
useful tool for visualizing and organizing the solution, but the inherent difficulty
in the reasoning involved remains. This paper is based on a talk presented at
the British Science Festival in September, 2017. We finish by leaving the reader
with another puzzle to solve, again adapted from [12]:
A crime has been committed on Smullyan Island. Three suspects made the fol-
lowing statements:
– Alf: I am guilty.
– Bof: I am the same type [Knight or Knave] as one of the others.
– Chaf: We are all of the same type.
Who is guilty? [Only read the footnote if you want to know who did it1.]
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